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|supervisor=[http://www.net.informatik.uni-goettingen.de/people/sufian_hameed Sufian Hameed] | |supervisor=[http://www.net.informatik.uni-goettingen.de/people/sufian_hameed Sufian Hameed] | ||
|duration= 6 months | |duration= 6 months | ||
|type= Bachelor | |type= Bachelor/Master/Student Thesis | ||
|status= | |status= Open | ||
}} | }} | ||
== Description == | == Description == | ||
The explosive growth in the unsolicited email (spam) in the past decade | The explosive growth in the unsolicited email (spam) in the past decade has made it impossible for email communications to function without spam protection/filtering. Currently, spam emails have largely outnumbered legitimate ones, increasing from 65% in 2005 to 89% (262 billion spam messages daily) in 2010. Despite that researchers and practitioners have developed and deployed a broad variety of systems intended to prevent spam; it remains a pressing problem of large scale. | ||
The spam protection systems used today only filter spam from the user’s inbox (i.e. recipient’s edge), but the spam already travels the network, and provokes non-negligible cost to network operators in terms of bandwidth and infrastructure. On the other hand, content-based filtering | The spam protection systems used today only filter spam from the user’s inbox (i.e. recipient’s edge), but the spam already travels the network, and provokes non-negligible cost to network operators in terms of bandwidth and infrastructure. On the other hand, content-based filtering, one of the most widely adopted defense mechanism, has turned spam problem into false positive and negative one. In consequence, this makes email delivery unreliable. | ||
In | In '''iSATS''' we will leverage the Identity of the email sender to authenticate the source. Further we will maintain a Trust Infrastructure to verify the legitimacy of email along with the sender. Following are the design requirements of iSATS. | ||
* Bind sender‘s identity to the domains, making the misbehaving sender visible. | |||
* Mail Server (MS) take ownership of the messages they transmit (sender authentication). | |||
* Each email user on the MS are assigned Trust Ratings (TR) to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate users. | |||
* MS at the receiver maintains local reputation of the sending MS. | |||
* iSATS remains transparent to end users and operated at the SMTP time. | |||
== Required Skills== | == Required Skills== |
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